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1 
A Distant Detachment 
New Zealand and the ILO 1919-1945 
Paper to the symposium 90 years of the ILO: the significance for Australia and 
New Zealand, Auckland, November 2009 
 
Steve Hughes and Nigel Haworth1
_____________________ 
 
 
A distant detachment 
In May 1919 a circular arrived on the desk of the New Zealand Secretary of Labour, 
F. W. Rowley. It gave notice that in accordance with the Annex to Part XIII of the Peace 
Treaty, an Organising Committee had been appointed for the forthcoming International 
Labour Conference. The circular explained that Part XIII provided for the creation of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), which would be a tripartite body made up of 
government, employer and labour representatives. The ILO would aspire to the 
maintenance of universal peace based upon social justice and, more concretely, 
promote social policy of the League’s members by means of International Labour 
Conventions and Recommendations. The forty Articles of the ILO Constitution were 
contained in section I of Part XIII of the Peace Treaty, the annex to which called for the 
first Conference of the new organisation to be held in Washington during October 1919. 
In a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Organising Committee Rowley wrote: 
I shall be obliged if you would kindly inform me of the extent, if any, to which 
New Zealand is affected by the various terms contained in this part of the Peace 
Treaty. I gather that Great Britain, being a party to the above Treaty, has entered 
into some agreement respecting the labour conditions but it is not clear whether 
the Dominion of New Zealand is itself bound in any way.
2
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In reply the Committee’s Secretary was clear: 
I am directed by the Organising Committee to say that as the King has ratified 
the Peace Treaty on behalf of the British Empire, following on its approval by the 
Parliaments of the United Kingdom and of the British Dominions, including New 
Zealand, the latter is bound by the Labour Part of the Treaty in the same way as the 
United Kingdom and as an original Member of the League of Nations has become 
under Article 387 a Member of the International Labour Organisation.
3
If being a founder member of the ILO had come as a surprise to the Secretary of 
Labour, New Zealand’s membership and the convening of the Washington Conference 
also took a while to be understood among New Zealand employer and worker 
organisations. In August 1919 the International Labour Office suggested in a letter to 
the Acting Prime Minister, James Allen
 
4
, that a pamphlet on the labour provisions of the 
Peace Treaty be given wide circulation in New Zealand, particularly, it emphasised, 
among labour leaders.
5
Once the pamphlet was distributed, requests to the government for additional 
copies were quick to follow. During January 1920, the New Zealand Federated Painters 
and Decorators Association, the Federated Newspaper Proprietors Association and the 
Denniston Coal Miners Union, all asked for more. Not surprisingly, the lack of 
information caused some confusion. In April, the New Zealand Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters and Joiners sent a letter to Prime Minister informing him that its National 
Council had passed a resolution demanding that New Zealand be represented by labour 
delegates at the Washington Conference - an event that had taken place during October 
the previous year. No doubt using its own channels of information, the Federation of 
Labour was the quickest to respond to the news of the Treaty provisions. On the 24th 
September 1919, it sent a telegram to the Prime Minister requesting information on the 
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3 
ILO and the matter of New Zealand representation at its Washington Conference. With 
no response, another telegram was sent on the 4th of October. This time the 
government responded that as no labour organisations had asked to be represented at 
the Conference, the matter had not been discussed.
6
The situation was no different among political parties. It was not until November 
1920 that a question on ILO membership was raised in the New Zealand Parliament. In a 
question to the Minister of Labour W. H. Herries, Peter Fraser
  
7
‘So far the labour organisations of this country had received no indications 
that such a body as the International Labour Bureau was in existence nor had 
they been offered the opportunity of being represented at any of the Conferences. 
Did the Government take the Bureau and the League of Nations seriously? Or did 
they treat them as a farce?’
 asked what was the 
relationship of the New Zealand government to the International Labour Bureau (sic) 
which had been created under the authority of the League of Nations? He had in his 
hand the Proceedings of the International Labour Conference held in Washington during 
the previous year, which had been laid on the table of the House by the Minister of 
Labour the day before. Fraser continued:  
8
The reply from the Minister of Labour, was dismissive. The documents had been 
laid on the table on the advice of the Crown Law Officers in accordance with the 
procedures laid down by the League of Nations. Moreover, as to the question of 
representation at the International Labour Conferences ‘Home representations could be 
well served by the High Commissioner (in London) rather than go to great expense in 
sending representatives to every Conference that was held by the League of Nations’.
  
9
In the debate that followed, Herries revealed that three conferences had been held, 
including an International Maritime Conference in Genoa, and admitted that in each 
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4 
case the Government had been requested to send representatives from New Zealand 
labour organisations. Herries stuck to his argument of expense but began to wilt under 
the pressure of opposition questioning. Prime Minister Massey rose in support:  
‘With regard to the activities of the League of Nations and the conferences it 
held, the authorities seemed to forget that New Zealand was twelve to fourteen 
thousand miles away from Europe and the documents generally arrived too late for 
action to be taken. This had been the case in regard to the Conference held in Genoa 
to which New Zealand representation had been requested’ 
Mr Fraser rose `How did Australia send a representative?’ 
Mr Massey replied `Perhaps Australia was a little nearer....’
10
The debate revealed both the position and attitude of the Government to the new 
Organisation. It had become a founder member of something it little understood or 
cared for and did not intend to spend either time or money on its affairs. The general 
question of Dominion representation in the affairs of the ILO had indeed been 
problematic. In the negotiations that preceded the enactment of Part XIII, the United 
States had been particularly opposed to having British Dominions on the Governing 
Body of the ILO, arguing that public opinion in the United States regarded the British 
Empire as having too much influence in the League of Nations.  
 
The result was a section in the labour clauses of the Treaty which declared that ‘no 
State including its dominions or colonies, whether they be self-governing or not, could 
have more than one Government representative on the Governing Body’. The purpose 
was to exclude British Dominions from the Governing Body of the ILO. The Dominions 
had faced the same problem concerning the right to sit on the League Council. In 
response, the Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden managed to push through a 
Resolution in a Plenary Session of the Peace Conference requiring the Treaty Drafting 
Committee to make amendments in the provisions setting-up the ILO so that they 
conformed to the Covenant of the League and the membership of its Council. When the 
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British Dominions finally got what they wanted in the Covenant, Borden then moved the 
adoption of the ILO amendment and the United States-inspired clause was removed.
11
The Washington Conference of the ILO was the first opportunity for countries to 
show their support for the new world order which the League of Nations hoped to 
symbolise. Thirty-nine countries sent delegations including the Dominions of Canada, 
India and South Africa who appeared as independent entities for the first time.
  
12
New Zealand viewed these events with a sense of distant detachment. Its economy 
had entered into a period of prosperity during the 1890’s. Rising wool prices and the 
impact of refrigeration on meat and dairy produce had expanded an export sector that 
benefited from rising prices on international markets. The Liberal Government, which 
had won the election of December 1890 with trade union support, introduced a range 
of labour laws including the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. The success 
of the Act saw New Zealand depicted as a ‘country without strikes’, attracting the 
attention of researchers from around the world.
 In 
terms of the aims and aspirations of the ILO itself, it was the first time that governments, 
employers and workers appeared at an international conference as equal partners. It 
was the first time that labour had the concept of ‘fairness’ applied to it in international 
labour law, and it was also the first time that an institution provided for in the Peace 
Treaty came into effective operation. 
13
 
 It was from the comfort of this 
economic and legislative success that New Zealand observed the wider world and 
questioned the relevance of a distant international body whose purpose seemed to be 
the promotion of labour standards lower than those prevailing in New Zealand.  
 
The onset of economic depression 
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6 
When New Zealand’s economic boom came to an end in the 1920s, it was replaced 
by widespread disillusionment, political instability and economic insecurity.
14
The New Zealand government has hitherto ignored the International Labour 
Organisation except insofar as it has been compelled to recognise it on account 
of its Treaty obligations. These, however, as far as the International Labour 
Organisation is concerned, it is always interpreted in the narrow sense … As 
reasons for holding aloof from the activities of the International Labour 
Organisation, the New Zealand government has alleged,1) the remoteness from 
New Zealand conditions the subjects treated at the International Labour 
Conference, 2) the prohibitive expense of participation. These objectives have 
been answered by the International Labour Office in many eloquent letters, but 
as each successive reply from the New Zealand government seems to show a 
stronger disinclination to collaborate with the International Labour Organisation, 
and even to understand the elements of its Constitution, for example the 
difference between Recommendations and draft Conventions, the Office has for a 
year desisted from attempts to persuade by letter. This restraint is wise as the 
present Prime Minister, Mr W.F. Massey, a strong imperialist, suspicious of ideas 
both of international and of industrial relations co-operation, will certainly 
remain impervious to any arguments which the International Labour Office may 
use on paper, except such as concern the Treaty obligations of New Zealand. It 
should, moreover, be remembered that the expense of participation in the 
Conference, even when the extravagant ideas, which the New Zealand 
government has on the subject, are corrected, would remain a genuine difficulty, 
as the government is bent on cutting down every penny of avoidable 
 As a result, 
relations between the New Zealand government and the ILO became even more distant. 
In 1922 an internal ILO report noted: 
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7 
expenditure.
15
New Zealand’s attitude toward the Organisation during the 1920s can be gleaned 
from correspondence between the Department of External Affairs and the ILO. During 
October 1921 External Affairs took over responsibility for the ILO from the Department 
of Labour. From then onward, the tone of correspondence seemed to shift from 
reluctant co-operation to outright non-co-operation. Three examples serve to illustrate 
this.  
 
A drafted response to an ILO questionnaire surveying views on the reform of the 
Governing Body’s Constitution read: 
I may add that the Governing Body of the International Labour Office is 
constituted to include twelve persons representing Governments, six persons elected 
by the delegates to the Conference representing the Workers; and of the twelve 
representing the Governments eight are to be nominated by the countries of chief 
industrial importance and four by the countries selected for the purpose by the 
Government delegates at the Conference. As New Zealand is not represented on the 
Governing Body, and as no delegates have as yet been sent to any Conference, it 
does not seem desirable to make any comment on the matter.
16
The final version of the response personally signed by New Zealand Prime Minister 
William Massey and in which the final paragraph read: 
 
‘In reply I have to inform you that the Government of New Zealand has no 
observations to make on the different points raised in the questionnaire’
17
Finally, in response to a request for observations on unemployment statistics a 
letter to the ILO read:  
 
Sir, 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th 
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8 
September last asking for the observations of the New Zealand Government on 
the question of statistics on unemployment. In reply I have to state that there is 
usually very little unemployment in this country and especially in view of the fact 
that New Zealand is so far removed from Europe it does not appear to be 
necessary to submit any observations on the proposal. 
I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant
18
 
 
A dubious distinction 
At the beginning of 1928, the Christchurch Press commented on the observations of 
a Dr Hight, a Canterbury University College academic who had recently returned from 
an exchange visit to the University of Leeds in England. Dr Hight had argued that New 
Zealand’s minimalist policies toward the ILO drew on the smug belief that it still led the 
world in social reform and had nothing to gain from closer involvement in its affairs. The 
Christchurch Press quoted him as saying that ‘we do not occupy the position we had in 
the nineties’ and that New Zealand was not contributing what it should to ‘the political, 
economic and general intelligence of the world’ and needed to ‘take a much more 
active part than we do in the activities of the League of Nations and the International 
Labour Office’. However, the newspaper’s editorial was dismissive: 
...it is particularly interesting that he should have said (if he has been 
correctly reported) that the governments attitude to international gatherings is 
‘making it very difficult for the people of New Zealand in years to come’. So far as 
Geneva is concerned, the attitude of the Government has been, to date, that we 
are taking no great risk in leaving most of the issues raised there to the 
consideration of the Homeland, and that when Conferences are held at which it 
seems desirable to be represented directly it is sufficient to have our High 
Commissioner present ... Dr Hight is on very thin ice when he laments our greater 
world prominence in the ‘glorious nineties’. It is true that we did in the nineties 
get ourselves accepted abroad, or in some countries, as a community with 
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9 
advanced social and industrial ideas which we were successfully applying in 
practice. But everybody knows today that many of the experiments we made 
with so much confidence then have been proved since to be blunders and that 
opinion has hardened against them even during Dr Hights absence in England. It 
would be no great advantage to us to be still remembered abroad as the 
community that tried once to fly before it had learned to walk.
19
 
 
By 1930 New Zealand had the somewhat dubious distinction of being, along with 
San Domingo and Ethiopia, one of only three member States of the fifty-five strong ILO 
which had yet to attend one of its Conferences. However, with the onset of a world 
depression, New Zealand’s ability to retain a firm grip on the control of its own destiny 
became increasingly fragile. Mounting budget deficits and rising levels of 
unemployment prompted a shift from decades of interventionist experimentation and 
ad hoc social interference to policy initiatives based upon the fostering of an export-led 
recovery.
20
As the Depression began to bite, unemployment became a worldwide phenomenon. 
Countries retreated behind trade barriers both in an effort to protect their own 
industries and in the realisation that neither the self-healing powers of laissez-faire nor 
the classic instruments of government interventionism seemed capable of turning the 
tide. The machinery of world trade ground to a halt as economies retreated from 
international co-operation and turned instead to the protection of their own national 
markets. The worldwide depression became the first common problem faced by 
government, business and labour since the conclusion of the war.  
 How other economies were responding to the Depression and to what 
extent their ability to take part in a recovery had been affected became questions 
directly related to New Zealand’s own economic destiny. 
The crisis prompted a renewed search for political as well as economic alternatives 
as faith in liberal capitalism melted away. Some looked again toward the Soviet Union, 
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10 
which observed the chaos from the sidelines, its economy seemingly impervious to the 
slump.
21
 Others, in Germany, Italy and Japan turned to fascism and began planning the 
complete destruction of the old liberal system through the rapid expansion of a 
militaristic empire. Yet while intellectuals of the time wrote in fear for the world as the 
aggressive expansionism of the radical Right spread into China and Ethiopia, politicians 
looked upon it as a threat that could be appeased and contained.
22
Political consensus held that the Depression and mass unemployment offered a 
breeding ground for Communism. Speeches by politicians everywhere mixed comments 
on the slump with references to the threat. They pointed to the growth of the German 
Communist Party and the 85% unemployed which made up its membership while 
seemingly ignoring the equally rapid growth of the Nazi Party.
 Instead, they saw a 
greater danger elsewhere, one which had helped in the rise of fascism in the first place 
and on which they found common ground - the rise of working class power and the 
spread of communism. 
23
The Keynesian argument for the benefits of eliminating permanent mass 
unemployment was economic as well as political. Keynesians held, correctly, that 
the demand which the incomes of fully employed workers must generate, would 
have the most stimulating effect on depressed economies. Nevertheless, the 
 Communism was 
portrayed as the common enemy and guarding against the radical politicisation of the 
masses played a significant part in stimulating inter-governmental co-operation on the 
question of mass unemployment. In the face of economic protectionism and the growth 
of domestic nationalism, the fragile international order, which the League of Nations 
seemed increasingly incapable of sustaining, found itself on the point of collapse. What 
helped the continuation of some form of international collaboration was not 
international concern about militarist aggression of the radical Right but the collective 
fear of communism. For Hobsbawm,  
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11 
reason why this means of increasing demand was given such urgent priority ... 
was that mass unemployment was believed to be politically and socially explosive, 
as indeed it proved to be ...
24
A sense of autonomy 
 
If the League was now showing itself to be increasingly incapable of co-ordinating 
any significant form of international action,
25
 the ILO provided an alternative forum for 
discussion of the problem of mass unemployment and offered the opportunity to gather 
and collate information on national and international responses to the Depression. As 
Alcock points out ‘if Governments, business and labour were in trouble, they needed 
help and they needed ideas, and the ILO was given the opportunity to take the 
initiative’.
26
Thomas’s attempt to inspire a sense of autonomy in the organisation proved to be 
critical in this respect. Despite the intention of the architects of the Peace Treaty to set 
up two international organisations that were constitutionally linked
 
27
, with the League 
as the main body and the ILO as part of the ‘League system’
28
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the key protagonist in this strategy was Albert Thomas himself who from outset - 
through individual action and force of personality - intended to afford the ILO a sense of 
purpose and vitality that would distinguish it from the moribund political bureaucracy of 
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12 
the League. This he saw as vital if the ILO was to establish and retain the support of 
workers. Second, by setting up direct and independent channels of communication with 
the labour ministries, employer and worker organisations of member countries, he 
provided a profile for the ILO he hoped would pay dividends in the years to come. Third, 
despite the requirement that all members of the League were automatically members 
of the ILO, the view of Thomas was that the provision did not preclude the right of the 
ILO to admit its own members. This was a position that challenged both the 
constitutional links between the two organisations and the senior status of the League. 
The ILO had already admitted Germany and Austria into its ranks during the first 
International Labour Conference in 1919 while the League still deliberated over their 
status. The action prompted friction between the two Organisations but the issue 
remained academic until Brazil left the League in 1926 but continued to remain a 
member of the ILO.
29
As the crisis deepened, inflation became the overriding factor in the economic 
responses of a number of European countries, prompting a reduction in government 
expenditure, tight controls on credit and a rise in taxation.
 As a result, the membership of the two organisations were 
effectively de-coupled, paving the way for the ILO to be construed as an international 
organisation in its own right and accepted as a key forum for international debate on 
the Depression. Thus, while disillusionment with the League spread, the ILO was 
sufficiently distanced from it - institutionally and politically - for the international 
community to continue to support its activities. 
30
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 In New Zealand, the 
impetus for an export-led recovery was tempered by domestic concerns about 
increasing wage demands and their impact upon inflation. The onset of the Depression 
prompted an attack on its underlying causes at home. In examining policy responses to 
the economic crisis in both New Zealand and Australia, Endres and Jackson point out 
that, ‘Nominal wage levels were attacked in both countries as reaction set in to any 
deliberate expansion of demand either by fiscal or wage-fixing mechanisms. The tone of 
30
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policy throughout the Depression years was contractionary, tempered only by the fear 
of creating social and political upheaval’.
31
Edward John Riches 
 It was in these circumstances, and following a 
Cabinet meeting at the end of January 1930, that the New Zealand Government finally 
decided to send a delegation to the International Labour Conference held in Geneva 
that year.  
A figure who was to become pivotal in relations between the ILO and the New 
Zealand Government was Edward John Riches. A New Zealander, Riches joined the ILO 
in 1927 soon after graduating in Economics from Canterbury University College.
32
During February, March and April I delivered a total of more than twenty 
addresses on the work of the Organisation to audiences in nine different centres. 
The size and character of the audiences varied greatly. The attendance ranged 
from about a dozen (N.Z. Employer’s Federation Executive Council) to over five 
hundred (secondary school boys), and in most cases was between fifty and one 
hundred and fifty. The audience included, in addition to the two examples 
already cited, trade unionists, employer’s and manufacturer’s association 
members, branches of the League of Nations Union, Rotary Clubs, Worker’s 
 For 
the next ten years Riches became the ILO’s main liaison with New Zealand, responsible 
for gathering information on New Zealand labour conditions during a period when such 
information was a scarce commodity in Geneva. At a time when the work of the ILO was 
either unknown or misunderstood in New Zealand, raising the profile of the 
Organisation became an important part of Riches’ activities. In his Missions to New 
Zealand, Riches would embark on a series of speeches and talks to groups and 
organisations throughout the country. For example, in his Mission Report of 1930 he 
wrote: 
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14 
Educational Association group’s, one University Club, a Women’s Institute, 
University students and public meetings.
33
 
 
In the course of these talks, it had become clear to Riches that general 
understanding of international affairs among the New Zealand public varied 
considerable. He criticised a general lack of intellectual leadership in country cut off 
from international contacts through geographical isolation and preoccupied with the 
‘pioneering problems of a young and rich economy’.
34
 He accused the University of New 
Zealand of being hampered by ‘limited resources and inadequate staff’ and lamented an 
educational system that, while highly efficient, ‘has not succeeded in supplying the 
intellectual leadership that is the country’s greatest need at the present time’.
35
In all respects the importance of the print media stood out. Newspapers remained 
the only medium through which most of the general public of New Zealand could be 
reached and were the primary mechanism for moulding public opinion. In this regard, 
Riches paid particular attention to arranging meetings with newspaper editors 
whenever he could. The activities of the ILO were outlined and the aims and methods of 
the International Labour Conference were explained to any editor willing to see him.  In 
the majority of these cases, knowledge of the ILO proved to be scant. Riches’ purpose 
was to ‘win over’ editors of the leading newspapers in the country and procure greater 
press interest in the activities of the ILO. In the context of Riches criticism of the general 
lack of discussion of international affairs at the time, and in the light of continuing 
attempts to persuade the New Zealand government to send a delegation to the 
International Labour Conferences, the role of newspapers became critical in winning 
support for the ILO in New Zealand. 
  
As it turned out, the decision of the New Zealand government to send a delegation 
to the Conference in 1930 prompted greater press interest in the ILO and led to 
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editorials on the issue in a number of leading newspapers.
36
 There was some irony in the 
timing of the New Zealand government’s decision. While the expense involved had in 
the past been `a convenient excuse for not sending a delegation’, 1930 proved to be a 
year when expense was for once a real obstacle. After years of lobbying the New 
Zealand government to participate more fully in ILO activities, Riches was aware that 
unfavourable reports from any of the delegates to the Conference would result in the 
same arguments for non-attendance being employed with considerable force the 
following year.
37
Riches’ Mission in 1930 was to be the latest attempt to persuade the New Zealand 
government to send a delegation to the International Labour Conference and to raise 
the vexed issue of international labour conventions and their ratification. His intention 
was to avoid talking to the press until he had the opportunity to talk representatives of 
the New Zealand Government. When the news of the decision was announced Riches 
abandoned his plan and instead gave an interview to the press on the advantages and 
procedures of New Zealand’s representation at the next Conference. He also took the 
opportunity to raise the issue of international trade, ‘Because of the ramifications of 
international trade, New Zealand, with its high standards of living and good working 
conditions and labour legislation, should have a particular interest in the organisations 
efforts to raise the standard in other countries’.
 
38
The interview was, as he hoped, widely reported. Although irrelevant to a decision 
already made, the press reports prompted the Government to despatch quickly circulars 
calling on employer and worker organisations to nominate representatives. While the 
nomination of the employer and worker delegates seemed to Riches clear cut
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Riches wrote of Shailer-Weston, `Mr Weston is not noted for his progressive outlook, 
but is, I fear, in that respect as in others, truly representative of the majority of the 
employers of this country’. Of Jim Roberts he observed `Mr Roberts ... will I imagine, in 
spite of a slight fondness for bluff and a tendency to combativeness (of a rather good 
natured kind) prove himself to be a definite acquisition to the Conference’.
40
The Prime Minister Sir Joseph Ward was, during this period, constantly absent from 
the House through ill health. Riches requests to meet him were turned down as Ward 
convalesced in Rotorua on the advice of his doctors. Instead, three meetings with the 
Minister of Labour, W.A. Veitch, were arranged in Ward’s absence.  The meeting’s 
proved to be revealing. Riches wrote: 
 The 
nomination of the Government delegate was far more controversial.  
I had three interviews with Minister of Labour ..., in the course of which the 
relations of New Zealand and the International Labour Organisation were 
discussed at considerable length. On the first of these occasions (at Christchurch 
on 4 February) our conversation was concerned almost entirely with the nature, 
composition and functions of the delegation to the XIV Session of the Conference. 
Mr Veitch apparently knew very little about the work of the International Labour 
Organisation and was not greatly interested in it. He showed some desire to hear 
as much about it as I could tell him in an hour’s conversation, but evidently 
retained at the end of that time his original conviction that New Zealand could 
gain little except in the most indirect way, from the work of the Organisation, 
and that consequently it mattered very little what he or his government did 
about it... I came to the conclusion that the Governments decision to send a 
delegation to the Conference this year had been dictated by political expediency 
rather than by any appreciation of the work of the ILO. Facts which have since 
come to my notice show that the concession of representation was, indeed, little 
more than a sop to the Labour Party, the support of which is indispensable to the 
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continuance in office of the present Government.
41
 
 
The United Party had come to power in 1928 to the surprise of those who had 
predicted a straight fight between the incumbent Reform Party, led by Gordon Coates, 
and the Labour Party led by Harry Holland - who, along with Walter Nash and Peter 
Fraser, had transformed Labour from a protest party to a credible alternative 
government.
42
  The election result turned out to be more a rejection of the Reform Party 
than a victory for United - a coalition of anti-Coates independents and the Liberal Party 
led by Joseph Ward. Similarly, Labour’s support for Ward’s government stemmed more 
from a fear that a return to power by Reform would lead to an attack on wages than 
from any punitive perspective on the United Party. In his seventies, Ward thus found 
himself leader of a minority government dependent upon the Labour Party to stay in 
power,
43
 and Prime Minister of a country in the throes of an economic depression. The 
political uncertainty was exacerbated by Ward’s constant absence through ill health and 
his refusal to delegate any real decision making to those around him. The result was 
political inertia in the face of an alarming increase in the overseas deficit, crumbling 
business confidence and rising social hardship among many New Zealanders.
44
In May 1930, the ailing Joseph Ward resigned. Soon after, Labour withdrew its 
support for the coalition, leaving a weak and disorganised Government struggling with a 
depressed economy and facing a very difficult Parliamentary Session. As a result it was 
in need of all the support it could muster. One consequential outcome was the 
nomination of Professor A. H. Tocker of Canterbury University College as the 
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Government Representative to the XIV International Labour Conference. Harold Butler, 
the ILO Assistant Director, sent a letter of congratulations to both Shailer-Weston and 
Jim Roberts. The letter to Shailer-Weston drew attention to the same issues Riches had 
raised in his interview to the New Zealand Herald a few months earlier, including 
international trade, ‘Asia has now become a competitive field of its own, particularly 
with regard to textiles...(but)…when they meet with European delegates, the Asiatic 
delegates are somewhat inclined to sit by and offer the excuse that their countries 
standards cannot be expected to come up to the European ones’.
45
Riches was confident that favourable reports from the Conference would be 
forthcoming from both Roberts and Shailer-Weston. Of Tocker there was less certainty. 
His nomination came as a surprise to everyone outside of the Cabinet and was 
immediately the subject of controversy. Minister of Labour W. A. Veitch announced that 
Tocker had been chosen as the Government representative to the ILO Conference 
because he was a leading economist who could bring back ‘an unbiased report based 
upon scientific lines’.
 
46
Despite his position as Professor of Economics at Canterbury University College, 
Tocker’s reputation as an economist was a controversial one. In May 1930 Riches 
described Tocker as: 
 A delegation representing the Labour movement protested 
vigorously against his appointment. They accused Tocker of arguing for the competitive 
advantage of lower labour standards and the unrestricted right of employers to manage 
without interference from the New Zealand Government or trade unions. For their part, 
the Labour Party and some employers expressed their own reservations over the 
Governments choice.  
...a sincere exponent of laissez-faire doctrines in economics...regarded by the 
majority of the labour movement as reactionary and incompetent. Most of the 
employers, though they applaud rather than condemn his point of view, probably 
share to some extent the labour distrust of his ability as an economist, Neither 
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side is altogether satisfied with his (sic) choice as Government delegate.
47
 
  
Riches believed that despite the concerns over the choice of Tocker, his report 
would ‘on the whole’ be a fair and favourable one. Moreover, he was hopeful that the 
decision to send a delegation to the International Labour Conference was evidence of a 
lasting change in the New Zealand Government’s attitude toward the ILO.
48
A short fat man with a florid face and a spade-like beard. 
 Two things 
influenced Riches conclusions. First, he believed that despite Tocker’s faith in laissez-
faire, exposure to the thinking and experiences of other delegates at the Conference 
and a closer understanding of the work of the ILO would help modify Tockers views and 
have a favourable influence on his report to the New Zealand Government. Second, 
despite the government describing the delegation as an ‘experiment’, the outcome of 
which would influence decisions on whether or not to send future delegations, Riches 
judged that once the New Zealand Government had committed itself to sending a 
delegation to the International Labour Conference, the principle of representation 
would have been established. He reasoned that once this had happened, future 
Governments would find it difficult to reverse ‘for reasons of expense alone’. As it 
turned out, Riches was wrong on both these counts. 
At the beginning of October 1930 Riches wrote to Butler informing him of the 
outcome of a meeting he had arranged with Tocker as the latter was on his way home 
to New Zealand from Geneva.
49
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the conservatism of the employer representative at the Conference, Shailer-Weston, 
had ‘influenced considerably’ his conclusions. Riches continued:  
Tocker’s report, if it is as critical as his comments lead me to expect, will 
probably constitute a fairly serious obstacle - though not necessarily an 
insuperable one - to the sending of a delegation from New Zealand next year. 
Newspaper comment on it will be illuminating, but the main determinate of the 
Government’s decision will, of course, be the position and strength of the Labour 
Party. 
50
Tocker’s comments proved to be critical beyond what Riches had expected. At the 
end of October, he wrote to Butler again: 
 
The newspaper account of Professor Tocker’s address confirms my 
impression that his report would be laudatory of the Office and critical of the 
Conference; but I scarcely expected him to make such sweeping and unguarded 
statements in public. 
51
 
 
Riches’ letter referred to an address Tocker had given to the Canterbury Employers’ 
Association at the end of October 1930. The address was reported in some detail by the 
Christchurch Times - whose editor, Riches believed, was a supporter of Tocker’s 
nomination as the Government delegate to the Conference.
52
 In his address, Tocker 
described his reactions at the end of the Geneva Conference, ‘I left the Conference 
feeling that it was useless. It was really nothing but a background for flamboyant 
Continental oratory’.
53
There was an enormous amount of rubbish talked. The temperature was 
about 85 degree’s in the shade, everybody smoked, and the atmosphere was very 
thick... One of the British workers delegates, a rather pompous individual, railed 
 He went on: 
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against the capitalist system; we got that sort of rubbish again and again. 
Perfectly fair clauses were thrown out because of prejudice, and a tremendous 
amount of sloppy sentimentalism was talked... Mr Thomas is a short, fat man 
with a florid face and a spade-like beard. The gesticulations of the Continental 
people nearly made us laugh. I tried hard to listen to A. J. Cook, the British miner 
delegate, but he was so emphatic that he was almost unintelligible. What had 
the Conference achieved; what could it achieve. Voices: Nothing.
54
 
 
Despite these comments and the negative perception of Tocker’s abilities as an 
economist, his address to the Canterbury Employer’s provides an insight to the 
difficulties that the ILO was facing at the time. With the onset of economic depression, 
countries were beginning to shift away from policies of international co-operation in 
favour of ‘national, political and economic autism’.
55
 The shift led to a psychology of 
mutual suspicion and distrust which permeated the International Labour Conference 
and undermined its standard setting activities.
56
Many countries consider ratification an expression of sympathy. Several have 
ratified conventions, but passed no legislation whatever; others have done the 
same but rendered them inoperative by providing no legislation; and others have 
even passed the laws but have not carried them into effect. Countries which have 
ratified the eight hours day convention work a ten, and in some cases a twelve 
hour day. The Continental countries distrust one another too much to carry them 
into effect. The Conference is obsessed with Europe. It is really trying to raise the 
standards of Eastern Europe to those of the West of the Continent. The South 
American delegates have a pleasant time and voted here and there, but I don’t 
 Moreover, the Conference’s 
preoccupation with Europe was beginning to divide ILO members and become a subject 
of real concern for the Organisation’s permanent secretariat. On these and other issues 
Tocker commented: 
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think they do much afterwards. No great contribution was wanted from New 
Zealand, and the delegates, I found, were not particularly interested in us.
57
 
 
Tocker’s address was widely reported. However, the response of the New Zealand 
press was mixed - giving some credence to the effort Riches had devoted in lobbying 
various editors on the ILO’s activities. For example, while the editorial of the 
Christchurch Times endorsed Tocker’s criticisms, the Christchurch Press, erstwhile a 
supporter of Tocker’s views on the New Zealand economy, rebuked him.
58
 Elsewhere, an 
account of Tocker’s criticisms published in the journal Economic Record prompted a 
detailed response by Riches himself.
59
Tocker’s report served to reinforce the New Zealand Government’s ambiguous 
attitude toward the ILO. While it saw value in the research activities of the Organisation, 
it found little relevance in its Conventions and the activities of the Conference. This 
position was echoed by Shailer-Weston, Employer representative to the 1930 
Conference, ‘As far as industrial relations are concerned, New Zealand is ahead of all the 
nations represented, other than Australia, especially in the spirit of conciliation and 
confidence now growing up between employers and labour organisations. This is an-all 
important point, and it will be many years before other countries reach this position’.
  
60
In his report Shailer-Weston once again turned to the perennial issue of expense 
and argued that the ‘economies’ of sending a regular delegation to the Conference 
‘were not sufficient’ but maintained that New Zealand should keep in touch with the 
research and reports of the Organisation: 
 
This is the most useful work to New Zealand now being carried out by the ILO. 
It has become a great clearing house for information upon all industrial and 
commercial matters. It has some very able and enthusiastic officials at its head. 
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Moreover, especially as we go with Japan, China and India, and other eastern 
countries, it is an important safety valve against Bolshevistic and Communistic 
activities.
61
 
 
Shailer-Weston’s final comment referred to a concern among employers and 
Government that the ‘communist menace’ was having an increasing influence in the 
industrial life of New Zealand. Rising unemployment, and a perception that the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1932 and the decisions of the 
Arbitration Court were the outcome of political attempts to undermine labour, led to a 
growing disillusionment with the ability of trade unions to defend the interests of their 
members. Some, such as the coalminers, hoped to rekindle grassroots activism by 
calling a national strike. Others, such as the freezing workers, simply refused to accept 
wage cuts of between 16 and 66 per cent for the 1932-33 season. Elsewhere, the 
dissatisfaction and agitation of the growing army of unemployed saw riots in Dunedin, 
Christchurch and Wellington and, most seriously, in Auckland as a 20,000 strong protest 
march against unemployment and wage cuts erupted into riot in Queen Street.
62
 The 
Prime Minister, G. W. Forbes, attributed the riots to the work of Communist agitators. 
The various, and often draconian, pieces of legislation that the Coalition Government 
rushed through Parliament as a result were merely interpreted as panic measures and 
confirmed a belief that Government inaction in the face of a deteriorating economy 
rather than Communist agitation was the root cause of the disorder. In reality, the New 
Zealand Communist Party, despite its growth in numbers, had little impact apart from 
its influence in the National Unemployed Workers Union who’s only really radical 
demand was the abolition of the Arbitration Court.
63
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The New Zealand Government struggled with an economic depression without 
parallel in living memory. With a fall in the price of its primary exports - particularly 
wool, butter, cheese and mutton - a halt on the traditional bale-out of overseas 
borrowing, a drop in national income and the value of national production, and with the 
level of unemployment at an historic high, a period of economic and political austerity 
swept over the country.
64
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that New Zealand is in the throes 
of a severe psychological as well as economic depression. The spectacle of a 
Government whose policy is a curious combination of drift, deflation and 
doubtful expediencies; the small results from the great expectation of Ottawa;
 In 1933 Riches was moved to write: 
65
 
the repeated failure of international conferences; the lack of agreement among 
local economists - such factors as these have destroyed public confidence in 
established leaders and led to wide-spread discontent. To a greater extent, 
perhaps, than in most other countries, the depression is regarded as a sort of 
natural calamity, a phenomenon that no amount of human foresight could have 
avoided; and to this extent the public reaction is one of resignation rather than 
constructive planning. There is a tendency, not without reason, to regard the 
causes of the depression as almost entirely international, and the possibilities of 
recovery as dependent wholly on international co-operation. Lip service to the 
ideals of freer trade and international co-operation is, however, accompanied, as 
in other countries, by tariff, trade and currency problems of the very kind which 
tend to aggravate the world situation. Although some of the recent legislation of 
the present Government has been radical enough, the main body of opinion in 
the country is still conservative, and there is an almost hysterical fear of 
communist ideas.
66
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So it was no surprise when New Zealand failed to send a delegation to the 
International Labour Conference in the years following the 1930 ‘experiment’. It was a 
country run by a politically fragile government struggling with an economy in the throes 
of a deep depression. In sum, Riches’ concerns about the reports of Shailer-Weston, and 
Tocker in particular, had to a large degree been justified. However, perhaps a more 
critical influence on the decision of the Government had been the resignation of Sir 
Joseph Ward. Ward’s minority United Party had held power after the election of 1928 
on the basis of Labour Party support. Among the concessions extracted from Ward in 
return was the establishment of regular delegations to the International Labour 
Conference. Once Ward resigned for health reasons in May 1930, the chances of Labour 
getting similar concessions from his successor, G. W. Forbes, were slight. Labour 
withdrew its support for United, prompting a new coalition between the United and 
Reform Parties. In December 1931, a general election saw the new coalition in power 
and with it the realisation that any further delegations to the International Labour 
Conference would only be forthcoming following the election of a Labour government. 
The inability of the League to deal with the world depression provided an opportunity 
for the ILO to offer an alternative forum for international discussion on the crisis. In this 
respect, the ability of ILO staff to gather and collate information on national responses 
to the Depression, and the determination of Albert Thomas to distance the ILO from the 
League, institutionally and politically, proved critical. If the Organisation was to retain 
the support of labour it had to demonstrate a vitality that made the prospect of an 
international labour standards regime a real and dynamic one. The International Labour 
Conferences remained a critical part of this process. It was the forum in which 
government, employer and labour representatives of ILO member states examined the 
research, debated and finally voted. Thomas viewed this process of interaction, 
collaboration, and tripartism, as the life-blood of the Organisation. Its function was to 
generate support for social justice and worker rights through international Conventions 
and Recommendations. Supported by research from its Geneva-based secretariat, the 
bulk of ILO activity lay here. 
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In pursuing social justice, the radicalisation of the working class occupied the minds 
of political decision-makers throughout the industrialised world. The economic 
depression, and its most visible face - mass unemployment - became a worldwide 
phenomenon. The perception of unemployment as a breeding ground for political 
unrest -from the Left rather than the Right - prompted greater international 
collaboration. In such circumstances, New Zealand’s ‘distant detachment’ from the 
activities of the ILO became more tenuous. A politically fragile coalition government 
struggled with a deteriorating economy which manifested itself socially in rising 
unemployment and street riots in its major cities.  
However, attendance at the XIV International Labour Conference was more an 
outcome of political expediency than a genuine belief in the value of the ILO to New 
Zealand. It remained an organisation of which the government and its supporters had 
little understanding. Except to proclaim that industrial legislation in New Zealand was 
already in advance of other countries, the ILO was largely ignored. New Zealand 
government’s relative lack of interest in international affairs seemed to reflect the 
attitude of most New Zealanders.
67
 Even the League of Nations, on whose foundations 
hopes for lasting peace were constructed, was viewed as a waste of money and nothing 
more than a dangerous rival to the British Empire.
68
 
  
A muddled benevolence. New Zealand and the question of ratification. 
On the 6th December 1935, Labour finally took office as the Government of New 
Zealand. With the United and Reform parties largely discredited, its strength was 
unequalled in New Zealand politics since the days of the Liberal Government under the 
popular Richard ‘King Dick’ Seddon.
69
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Customs and ‘everything to do with money’; Richard Semple, Works and Transport; DG 
Sullivan, Industries and Commerce; H.G.R Mason, Attorney-General and HT Armstrong, 
Labour. 
A brief conversation took place between Riches and Armstrong following the 
latter’s appointment as Minister of Labour. Armstrong told Riches that although he had 
not yet had the opportunity to examine the general question of New Zealand’s relations 
with the ILO, he assured him that New Zealand would be represented at the next 
International Labour Conference.
70
 The two met again in January 1936. At Armstrong’s 
request, Riches prepared a five page memorandum on New Zealand’s relations with the 
ILO.
71
i Representation at the International Labour Conference 
 Copies were given to Savage, Nash and Fraser. The memorandum had four 
sections: 
ii Parliamentary Discussion of Conventions and the Reports of Delegates 
iii The Ratification of Conventions 
iv The ILO as a source of information 
Riches urged the New Zealand Government to select, as soon as possible, the New 
Zealand delegates to the Twentieth Session of the International Labour Conference. 
Drawing on the experience of Worker delegates to previous Conferences, he requested 
that advisors be appointed to those attending for the first time, in an effort to overcome 
the problem of representative continuity and delegate efficiency. On the thorny issue of 
ratification, Riches drew heavily on the article by E.P. Haslam
72
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Early ratification of these Conventions by New Zealand would be valuable 
gesture and would constitute tangible proof of New Zealand’s goodwill toward the 
objects and work of the ILO. It would raise New Zealand from the undignified 
position which she at present occupies as one of the few important countries which 
have ratified none of the Conventions; and it would be a definite contribution 
towards the effectiveness of these Conventions, and thus toward the general upward 
influence exerted by the ILO on conditions in backward countries. Moreover, it is 
worth remembering that even when existing legislation is ahead of the provisions of 
a Convention, ratification is no mere formality from the point of view of the workers, 
to whom it provides a guarantee that standards set will not at any later date be 
lowered.
73
 
 
Armstrong kept his promise. New Zealand sent a full contingent of delegates to the 
1936 International Labour Conference and brought to an end the political inertia which 
Riches and others had worked hard to overcome. Yet on the subject of ratification, the 
new Labour Government remained cautious. In response to questions in Parliament, 
Savage argued that the matter was under consideration but the legislative programme 
for the current sitting would concentrate on New Zealand’s domestic needs. However, 
he suggested that specific Conventions could be ratified either without amendment, or 
with only slight modification, of existing law. The matter of ratification, Savage told the 
House, would be ‘brought up for consideration when the legislative programme for the 
next session is under review’.
74
The historian F. L. W. Wood was a regular critic of the Government’s policy on 
ratification. He was particularly critical of the technical advice the Government was 
receiving from its civil service. In a letter to Riches during February 1937, Wood 
wondered ‘how far a Government is likely to get these days on a basis of good 
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intentions, personal ability and energy - not always backed with adequate technical 
advice.
75
The Prime Minister was entirely sympathetic - but in a vague and pleasant 
way only. The New Zealand Government in effect would do all that it was right to 
do, but would not ratify Conventions which fell below New Zealand’s standards 
and thus endorse ‘mediaeval conditions
 Wood was Professor of History at Victoria University College and President of 
the Wellington Branch of the League of Nations Union (LNU). It was the regular practice 
of the LNU to call on the New Zealand Prime Minister following the conclusion of its 
annual conference. Wood’s letter to Riches referred to the response of Michael Savage 
when the LNU raised the ratification of ILO Conventions. Wood wrote: 
76
Riches was disturbed by the news. It seemed to contradict Savage’s comments to 
the House on October 1 1936 and represented a sharp contrast to the positive 
responses he had gleaned from Armstrong since his appointment as Minister of Labour. 
Moreover, Savage’s comments suggested a significant lack in understanding of the 
rationale for ratifying international labour standards. On April 7 1937, Riches wrote to 
Wood: 
 
The statement which you report calls for certain comments. In the first place, 
New Zealand cannot, until it passes further legislation, ratify Conventions which set 
standards higher than those of existing laws; the only Conventions which it can ratify 
are those of existing laws; the only Conventions which it can ratify are those which at 
the time of ratification, are fully covered - which either, that is to say, are identical 
with or ‘fall below’ New Zealand standards. Cases of absolute identity are likely to be 
rare so that if Conventions which fall below New Zealand standards are to be ruled 
out, the number which it will still be possible to ratify will be very small. To subscribe 
to the objects of the International Labour Organisation and at the same time to 
refuse to ratify Conventions which can be ratified without any difficulty would be to 
show a striking inconsistency. In the second place, it should be noted that the 
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suggestion that the ratification of Conventions which ‘fall below’ New Zealand’s 
standards would involve the endorsement of ‘mediaeval conditions’ is based on a 
complete misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the Conventions. To 
endorse a certain standard as a minimum below which conditions in no other country 
should be allowed to fall is not in any sense to imply that higher standards are not 
urgently desirable. Progress in less advanced countries must be by gradual stages 
and to set impossibly high standards would be to rob the Conventions of all practical 
value in the very cases in which they can be of greatest service. A country which 
ratifies a Convention undertakes to maintain standards at least as good as those set 
in the Convention. For it, as for other countries, the standards set in the Convention 
are minimum standards and there is nothing to prevent a ratifying country from 
enacting legislation of a more advanced type. Paragraph 11 of Article 19 of the 
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation provides expressly ‘In no case 
shall any member be asked or required, as the result of the adoption of any 
recommendation or draft Convention by the Conference, to lessen the protection 
afforded by its existing legislation to the workers concerned. 
The ratification by New Zealand of a series of International Labour Conventions 
would, in fact, have an effect precisely opposite to that suggested in the ‘mediaeval 
conditions’ statement. Each additional ratification by a country which effectively 
observes the provisions of the Convention tends to strengthen the upward influence 
exerted by that Convention on the standards of more backward countries. The 
exertion of such an influence is one of the principle objects of International Labour 
Conventions, and to refuse to make use of them for this purpose would be to rob 
them of a large part of their value. There is a strong moral obligation on the more 
advanced members of the International Labour Organisation to make the most 
effective use possible of these and other methods which the Organisation provides 
for furthering the objects to which all its members have subscribed; and it would ill 
become a country who claims to lead the world if it sought to evade its 
responsibilities in matters of this kind. It was natural enough that the present 
Government should not be able to find time during its first parliamentary session to 
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put through the ratification of International Labour Conventions, but it would be 
difficult to understand a failure to do so during the session which opens next 
August.
77
Riches’ letter represented a detailed exposition of the rationale underpinning the 
ratification of international labour standards and an insight into the motivations behind 
the activities of first Albert Thomas and then Harold Butler. In reply, Wood restated his 
original impressions of the meeting: 
 
I may have misled you slightly by not attracting an adequate character sketch of 
the Prime Minister whose remarks I quoted. But I am afraid that his statement gives 
a true indication of the rather muddled benevolence with which the government 
views some of these questions, plus
78 
an element of ultra caution which [may] 
originate in the civil service.
79
The letter confirmed the caution Riches had expressed to his ILO colleague W. L. 
Crocker, who was to visit New Zealand on his way to Australia during the Winter of 1937. 
In a six page memorandum Notes for your Mission to New Zealand - the primary 
purpose of which was to lobby the Government on ratification, Riches gave detailed 
advice to Crocker on who to meet and what to do while in New Zealand. Yet Riches was 
clearly not optimistic on the outcome. He wrote: 
 
If no action has yet been taken, it will be necessary to emphasis that the Office 
and supporters of the International Labour Organisation in other countries are 
confident that the Labour Government, which in opposition showed much interest in 
the work of the Organisation and urged the ratification of Conventions, will not fail 
to give tangible proof in this from, and during its first term of office, of its goodwill 
towards the aims and objectives of the Organisation. It was quite well understood 
that the volume of legislation which had to be handled during their first session and 
the consequent pressure on the time of Parliament and the Labour Department were 
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sufficient to account for the failure to take action on the Conventions last year, but 
no such excuse will be available for the session which is due to open August next.
80
Riches urged Crocker to try to persuade New Zealand to adopt a formal procedure 
for the adoption of International Labour Conventions by Parliament. Previous 
Governments had ignored the ILO’s constitutional requirement that each member 
submit Draft Conventions and Recommendations to their respective Parliaments within 
one year following the close of the International Labour Conference. Riches added ‘ If 
we can get New Zealand to adopt a proper procedure for the consideration of 
Conventions by Parliament, the chances of satisfactory collaboration in the future will 
be greatly improved’.
 
 
81
There had been some progress earlier. The 1936 Report of the Department of 
Labour contained a list of the Conventions adopted at the XIX Session and a summary of 
the agenda prepared for the XX Session of the International Labour Conference. 
Moreover, the agenda of the Conference, together with decisions taken on Conventions, 
were printed as a Parliamentary Paper. Yet the all consuming problem remained - no 
Conventions had been ratified by the New Zealand Government. If Wood was correct in 
his assessment of Savage’s attitude, then the opportunity for securing ratification had 
once again receded. 
 
As it turned out, Armstrong used the 1937 Conference to announce that the New 
Zealand Department of Labour was preparing proposals to ratify Conventions which 
‘could easily applied in New Zealand’.
82
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 Armstrong himself had taken an active and 
energetic part in the Conference, chairing a committee and giving a final speech which 
presented a very positive impression of the Conference. Nonetheless, Riches took 
nothing for granted and wrote to Wood suggesting that the League of Nations Union 
make representations to both Savage and Armstrong on their return from Geneva and 
attempt to persuade them that the necessary Parliamentary time should be made 
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available to debate the question of ratification.
83
On the March 1 1938, the New Zealand Government tabled a motion to ratify 
twenty two International Labour Conventions. The debate that followed two days later 
lasted from 2.30 in the afternoon until 10.30 in the evening but, with MP’s calling the 
Speakers attention to the dwindling numbers in the House, the motion was carried and 
one of the main goals of ILO activity in New Zealand was finally achieved. In an editorial 
the Wellington Evening Post wrote: 
 
Riches was careful to enclose with the 
letter two copies of the Provisional Record of the 1937 Conference containing the 
Armstrong speech. 
Ratification by the House of Representatives of 22 Conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation does not effect labour conditions in New Zealand. 
The International Labour Conferences have, in a course of years, adopted 62 
Conventions fixing standards for the employment of labour. These Conventions are 
binding upon the member nations only when they agree to accept them. The New 
Zealand law conforms to 22, probably more, of them, and the effect of ratification is 
formal notification to other nations of Dominion approval. The domestic significance 
therefore is not great. Nevertheless, it is desirable that this action should be taken. 
The great value of the International Labour Organisation is the influence it exercises 
in improving industrial conditions uniformly. There are many reforms that are 
desirable and practicable. A nation can be isolated from competition; but they 
become impracticable if competitive nations lag behind. The reforming nation, 
therefore, should not only affect reforms in its sphere, but should, for self-protection, 
put its weight behind a movement to make the reforms generally applicable. This is a 
consideration that can’t be ignored. One of the principle objections to the forty-hour 
week arises on that very point - that it is too far in advance of the stage reached by 
competitive countries, and consequently places New Zealand industry under a 
serious handicap. Support of the work of the International Labour Organisation may 
help lessen the handicap by bringing the nations into line. In the meantime a day 
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given to discussion of the work is not wasted, as it is a means of bringing that work 
under public notice and securing for it a measure of understanding and support.
84
By linking the issue of labour standards to international competition, the Evening 
Post’s comments reflected the arguments Riches expressed in his letter to Wood and 
those expressed by Butler in his correspondence with Jim Roberts. Drawing attention to 
the potential for labour standards in one country to impact upon the economic 
performance of another was more than simply an educative process. The observation in 
1933 that ‘...the ILO has done much useful work, though this has been rather in the field 
of promoting international discussion and spreading information about the various 
countries than in the direct improvement of industrial legislation’
 
85
Summary and conclusion 
 
misunderstood the 
politically complex nature of ILO activity. Had it been an organisation based purely on 
information gathering, then it would have not survived its formative years. 
The world beyond Europe was growing in importance economically and politically. 
Both Albert Thomas and Harold Butler recognised that in order to survive the ILO had to 
reflect this change. They attached great importance to the task of building an 
organisation that had universal and not just European relevance. Following the death of 
Thomas in 1932, Butler made the task a priority of his office. A significant factor in this 
respect was the entry of the United States into the ILO. Butler knew that once the 
United States became a member, the European dominance of ILO affairs would be 
broken, changes in the underlying structure of power would become more visible, and 
broader, more inclusive international coalitions would gradually emerge. As a result, he 
worked hard to make United States membership a reality.  The United States and New 
Zealand represented two extremes of Butler’s task. Both looked upon the ILO with some 
suspicion. Yet both were vital, in their own way, to its survival. In each case, the issue of 
state sovereignty rendered ILO membership and the ratification of international labour 
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standards a politically sensitive process. In the years between 1919 and 1934, the 
United States represented the most important example of these sensitivities. New 
Zealand, with a mixture of guarded and dismissive responses to ILO questions by its 
government, represented another. 
In both countries, political change was the catalyst for more positive, more 
proactive, relations with the ILO. Following the election of the Roosevelt administration, 
entry of the United States symbolised the end of European dominance and began the 
evolution of the international labour standards regime into a broader, more inclusive 
phase. In New Zealand’s case, the election of a more outward looking Labour 
government marked the turning point in relations with the ILO. The success of Labour’s 
programme depended on the co-operation of the unions. Part of the price of this co-
operation was closer, more active engagement with the ILO who now saw its long years 
of lobbying for the ratification of international labour standards by New Zealand finally 
fulfilled in 1938.   
The 1940s marked a period of close relations between the New Zealand and the ILO. 
Following the death of Michael Savage in March 1940, Peter Fraser took over as Prime 
Minister in the Labour government. Like others in the Labour Party, such as Harry 
Holland and Walter Nash, Fraser had a keen interest in international affairs and was 
familiar with the activities of the ILO. Labour had evolved into a broad-based, reformist 
party with a welfare and development programme that sought to undo the social 
neglect of the previous government. Its successful 1935 campaign called for state 
control of the Reserve Bank, credit and currency reform, guaranteed prices to farmers, 
and a host of welfare and labour reforms. By the end of 1936, it had restored wage 
rates to the level that operated in 1931, reinstated compulsory arbitration, introduced 
compulsory unionism, fixed a minimum wage, and legislated a forty-hour week.   
Internationally, Labour policy switched from the anti-League rhetoric of the early 
1920s to a proactive pro-League position. More broadly, while in the 1920s and early 
1930s New Zealand had abdicated responsibility for foreign affairs to Great Britain, 
under Labour, foreign policy began to develop a more independent outlook on world 
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affairs. Historically, Labour had always possessed a more international outlook than 
other New Zealand political parties. For its part, the Federation of Labour (FoL) was 
quick to offer its own ideas. Quoted in an article described as the first of its kind from 
the international labour movement,
86
 the FoL called for an International Labour 
Conference to be held outside Europe, ‘... for the purpose of studying the problems 
which will arise at the end of the war ... with regard to the future functioning of the 
International Labour Organisation and its headquarters, the ILO’.
87
 
 Thus once 
established in government, Labour’s increasingly independent stance on foreign policy, 
and the outbreak of the World War II, encouraged a much broader discussion of 
international issues - most notably, the reconstruction of the post-war world. It was a 
discussion that the ILO actively encouraged and one in which New Zealand was keen to 
demonstrate its confidence in taking its place in a new world order.  
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